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Abstract
(1) Problem definition : We consider a revenue-generating call center with inbound and outbound
calls, where service and sales activities are blended. For maximizing the call center’s revenue, the call
center manager exercises two levels of control; agent reservation for inbound calls and call outsourcing.
Given the influence of waits on purchase probability, we investigate the strategy of outsourcing customers
who have waited already, as opposed to outsourcing customers directly at arrival.
(2) Academic / Practical relevance: The main novelty of this article arises from the use of a single
framework to investigate combining agent reservation with outsourcing decisions, and a waiting time-based
outsourcing strategy. The existing literature only considers these two strategies in isolation and is restricted
to quantity-based decisions. From a practical viewpoint, our results aim to provide decision support tools
that are directly implementable in a call center’s routing software.
(3) Methodology : We apply a Markov decision process approach to optimize the manager’s decisions.
The particularity of our approach is that we use the experienced waiting time as a decision variable.
(4) Results: We prove that the optimal policy for reservation and outsourcing is of threshold type. Our
main conclusion is that outsourcing customers after letting them wait in-house generates higher revenue
than outsourcing calls at arrival. However, it is also detrimental to service quality. In addition, we identify
contexts where the difference between the two outsourcing strategies is significant.
(5) Managerial implications: Contrary to standard call center practices, which either consist of
specialized teams for one type of call, or only exercising one specific level of decision-making (reservation
or outsourcing), we demonstrate the potential of partial outsourcing with partial reservation. Our study
shows that small congested call centers are those where the benefits of implementing our results are the
greatest.
Keywords: Call centers; Markov decision process; outsourcing; agent reservation; service and sales activ-
ities.
1 Introduction
Services and sales activities. Call centers are generally a firm’s primary channel of interaction with its
customers. Historically, call centers were mainly considered as a service delivery channel with inbound calls
only. In computer hardware companies, for example, customers would contact the call center to obtain support
for their installation. However, from a marketing perspective, a call center also has the potential to become
an ideal sales environment. Agents are not only considered as a passive workforce that responds to demand
but are increasingly encouraged to look for new customers or new sales. In banks, for instance, agents might
contact their customers to propose a new insurance policy or a new financial product. To illustrate this,
Lerzan and Aks¸in (2010) note that 25% of bank transactions are projected to take place in call centers and
that 80% of the bank’s growth comes from selling additional products to existing customers. Consequently,
inbound call centers introduced revenue generation as a strategic priority.
In this context, an inbound caller requesting a service can also become a potential source of revenue for
the call center. Thus, standard performance measures such as waiting time no longer simply represent a poor
level of service, but also may impact customer’s reaction to sales offers. Given that a long wait is frustrating
and reduces the trust given by customers to the company, the chance that a customer in need of assistance
accepts an unexpected sales offer may decrease with the wait. This negative relation between the wait and
the purchase probability is given the most consideration in this article. However, Ulku et al. (2017) may
contradict this assumption by showing that a long wait is an incentive to consume more when customers have
consumption as a primary objective. This case is also examined in this paper. In both cases, it is important
for call center managers to control the system’s congestion, especially if having fewer customers would result
in more customers with greater buying potential.
Outsourcing. One strategy investigated to reduce the flow of inbound calls involves outsourcing some of
them. Outsourcing is implemented as a way to provide a sufficient service quality for most customers and
to reduce costs. The alternative to outsourcing is to hire more staff. For small call centers, it is however an
expensive option as it takes time to train and manage new employees. Larger call centers are usually better
structured to monitor them. Moreover, existing models for staffing in the call center literature are known to
be more effective for large call centers (Harrison and Zeevi, 2005; Bassamboo et al., 2006; Whitt, 2006). This
means that mistakes in staffing levels are often encountered in small call centers. Consequently, small call
centers often face situations of high congestion. Finally, even with an appropriate staffing level, the server
utilization and the risk of having long waits are worse in smaller call centers. For these reasons, small call
centers are particularly concerned by outsourcing strategies.
The outsourcing decision is complex when sales activities are blended with service ones. An outsourced
customer in need of a service no longer represents a sales opportunity. This means it may not be efficient to
outsource too many calls, especially those which have a high purchase probability. Moreover, since the waiting
time may influence the purchase probability, it should be taken into account in the outsourcing decision. The
traditional solution used in practice and in existing models in the academic literature is to outsource an inbound
call upon arrival (Aks¸in et al., 2008; Ren and Zhou, 2008; Koc¸ag˘a and Ward, 2010; Schrieck et al., 2014). The
decision to outsource a newly arrived call is based on the system’s state, i.e., on its expected waiting time.
This is referred to as a priori outsourcing. However, it is only one way of outsourcing. Another possibility,
proposed here, is to accept the new call in the queue, but to allow it to be outsourced later according to its
experienced waiting time. This is referred to as a posteriori outsourcing. Intuitively, both types of outsourcing
(a priori and a posteriori) have advantages and disadvantages. The advantage of a priori outsourcing is that
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it avoids any useless in-house waiting for outsourced customers, thereby reducing customer dissatisfaction due
to excessive waiting. On the other hand, it can lead to a customer being outsourced who in fact could have
begun a service within a reasonable time given the variability in service times. With a posteriori outsourcing,
a decision is taken based on actual waiting time. This provides better control of outsourcing and possibly
better sales potential. Despite the potential of a posteriori outsourcing policies, to the best of our knowledge,
they have not previously been addressed in the call center literature.
A priori and a posteriori policies are also implemented in contexts without outsourcing. Because of capacity
shortage, call centers commonly employ call rejection, either on arrival (a priori rejection) or after a certain
waiting period (a posteriori rejection). A posteriori rejection may or may not be followed by an automatic
message. For instance, Amazon employs a posteriori rejection without a message (simple disconnection of
the call), while Dior plays a voice message after a 2-minute wait. Different types of messages exist, such as
an invitation to call back later, to leave a message to be called back, or an invitation to use other resources
such as chats or email. Our partner, Interactiv Group, offers CTI (Computer Telephony Integration) software
which can reject calls after a certain waiting threshold. The threshold value is adjusted by the customers (the
call centers) depending on their business requirements. For instance, it is 6 minutes for the energy company
Primagaz, 5 minutes for the pharmaceutical company Sanofi, 3 minutes for the telecom operator Keyyo’s sales
call center, and 15 minutes for its technical hotline.
Blending. Outsourcing may therefore allow the call center to better serve and sell to customers. However,
due to the variability in arrivals, we may encounter situations where agents are idling. It could then also be
appropriate to let some agents initiate calls to propose sales offers so as to generate extra revenue for the
call center. The operational value of outbound calls is that they can be initiated at a chosen time. This
helps prevent idle overcapacity, and limits the need for extremely accurate forecasts. While the benefits of
combining inbound and outbound calls in call centers seem clear, the implementation comes with significant
operational challenges. Since the amount of work could be considerable, agents may be continually occupied,
either answering inbound calls or initiating outbound ones. Unless staffing levels are adjusted, pushing agents
to work in such conditions could lead to a degradation in service level in terms of the waiting time experienced
by inbound customers. The delay probability would be close to one, for instance. Initiating outbound calls
should therefore be limited in order to ensure the adequate service quality of inbound ones. One routing
solution proposed in the literature for this type of problem is to develop a reservation strategy (Bhulai and
Koole, 2003; Gans and Zhou, 2003). The idea is to keep a certain amount of idleness in the agents’ team by
not allowing agents to initiate outbound calls at all time.
Research question and contributions. We consider a call center with inbound and outbound calls in
which the service can generate revenue. Inbound calls initially request a service but can also represent a sales
opportunity. The willingness of inbound callers to buy is often related to their waiting experience. To avoid
excessive congestion, an outsourcer is contractually engaged to receive a given quantity of calls from the call
center per time unit. Therefore, an important challenge for the call center manager is to determine when
an agent should initiate an outbound call, and which inbound calls should be outsourced, primarily with a
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revenue maximizer perspective and, secondarily, with a consideration for the quality of the service provided.
Our main aim is to evaluate the potential of letting customers wait before being outsourced as compared to
outsourcing at arrival.
On the methodological level, we employ a Markov decision process approach to prove the threshold form
of the optimal routing policy for agent reservation and call outsourcing. The particularity of our approach
with a posteriori outsourcing is that we model the waiting time of the first customer in line as a decision
variable. This helps us to identify new structural properties of the value function which differ from the
classical convexity/concavity shown in a value iteration step approach. We also derive the call center’s expected
revenue and service quality, and prove their monotonicity properties in the control parameters. This allows us
to determine the constraints that the reservation and outsourcing thresholds should satisfy. We then explicitly
compute the relative value function under the optimal policy and prove that the optimal outsourcing threshold
can be computed after a finite number of iterations. This allows us to construct an efficient algorithm to derive
the optimal policy.
Next, we compare the two policy classes for outsourcing. The main proven result of the comparison is that
a posteriori outsourcing outperforms a priori outsourcing in a revenue maximizer perspective but not in the
quality of service one. In particular, the added value of a posteriori outsourcing is to ensure shorter waits for
customers who are served in-house detrimentally to outsourced customers. As expected, the difference between
the two outsourcing policies is shown to increase with the system congestion. Our numerical investigations
also show that the difference between the two policy classes is mostly significant for call centers with less
than 50 agents. For medium to large call centers, the two policies are virtually the same with less than 1%
difference in generated revenue and almost no wait. This means that the results of our study are applicable to
small call centers as in the Business-to-Business sector (Chevalier and Van den Schrieck, 2008) or larger call
centers organized in small independent teams (Jouini et al., 2008).
Different extensions to the initial model are investigated. We consider (i) the abandonment feature, (ii)
the possibility of the wait having a positive effect on purchase behavior, and (iii) the effect of having different
service rates between inbound and outbound calls. These model extensions do not contradict our main finding
but allow us to determine contexts where differences between the two policy classes are most significant.
With abandonment, assuming a threshold policy for outsourcing and reservation, we show that the algorithm
for computing optimal thresholds remains applicable. Extreme reservation/outsourcing strategies tend to
be optimal when customers are highly impatient. This reduces the relative benefits of implementing an a
posteriori outsourcing policy. When the wait has a positive effect, with or without abandonment, we prove
that extreme choices should be made for the outsourcing threshold. For the call center manager, this means
deciding either to outsource all inbound callers and become a specialized outbound contact center or serving
all inbound calls in-house. Therefore, it does not make sense to have a contract where only a given proportion
of inbound calls is outsourced. The effect of having different service rates between inbound and outbound
calls is less significant. We show, however, that the difference between the two policy classes is highest when
the service rates of inbound and outbound calls are close and when the arrival rate is sufficiently high.
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Structure of the article. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The first section ends with
a literature review. Section 2 defines the model and the optimization problem. Section 3 identifies the
optimal policies for reservation and outsourcing while Section 4 compares a priori outsourcing with a posteriori
outsourcing. Section 5 investigates different model extensions. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper and
highlights avenues for future research. All proofs are given in the online supplement.
Literature review. We distinguish five streams of literature related to this paper. The first deals with
the analysis of cross-selling opportunities in a queueing setting. The second is devoted to understanding
outsourcing strategies. The third analyzes multi-channel call center queueing models with reservation policies.
The fourth explores the nature and the impact of customer’s abandonment. The last considers queueing
models where decisions are based on customers’ waiting experience.
The combination of sales and services activities is referred to as cross-selling and is widely used in retail
banking call centers, for example. The empirical study by Aksin and Harker (1999) shows that although cross-
selling may significantly improve a firm’s revenue, it can have a detrimental effect on customer service due to the
additional load it creates on the system. To tackle this congestion problem, different studies have focused on the
development of optimal policies. The idea is to determine when cross-selling opportunities can be exercised
in a way that will maximize expected profit. To this end, Byers and So (2007) developed a mathematical
model which incorporates queueing congestion and customer profiles in order to determine the optimal control
policy to maximize revenue, showing the usefulness of real-time information for control decisions in a cross-
selling context. Gu¨nes¸ and Aks¸in (2004) investigated the different value-generation potential of customers and
determined a market segmentation scheme which divides customers into two groups (high and low). Looking
at various forms of customer segmentation, Gurvich et al. (2009) examined decisions on operational staffing,
call routing, and cross-selling to define near optimal policies. Another approach developed by Lerzan and
Aks¸in (2010) involved analyzing cross-selling issues as a dynamic service rate control problem, while Armony
and Gurvich (2010) described asymptotically optimal control and staffing schemes implemented as the system
load grows larger. Finally, Gu¨nes¸ et al. (2010) developed a model to show the negative impact a failed sales
attempt can have on a customer’s future behavior. This led to a new policy which took the customer’s history
into account. The policies developed in the aforementioned studies suggest that cross-selling opportunities
should only be exercised below a given number of customers in the system. In our paper, we also develop a
threshold type of control system. Our particularity is that a control on the customers’ experienced wait can
be exercised alternatively to a control on the queue length. Moreover, customers with a low purchase potential
can be outsourced.
There is a large body of literature on outsourcing strategies in call centers. Some articles focus on helping
firms to draw up the contract with an outsourcer (e.g., see Hasija et al. (2008) and Aks¸in et al. (2008)). In our
paper, the definition the contract corresponds to the volume-based contract developed in Aks¸in et al. (2008).
Outsourcing is often seen as a strategy to solve the problem of excessive demand. Therefore, the question
is to determine whether it is costlier to employ an extra agent or to outsource a larger quantity of inbound
calls. Ren and Zhou (2008) show that although a call center can coordinate staffing levels and outsourcing
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decisions, the resulting service quality is frequently below its optimal level. To address this issue, they show
the value of contracts where considerable attention is devoted to service quality. Koc¸ag˘a et al. (2015) develop
a joint policy for staffing and call outsourcing that minimizes the long-run average cost by solving a two-stage
stochastic program. Schrieck et al. (2014) consider staffing issues in a setting where short-term variability and
correlations in time-for-call-arrivals are taken into account. Their study leads to an extension of the square root
staffing rule and another staffing method which makes use of the Hayward approximation principles. Other
studies consider routing decisions and performance evaluation. For instance, Gans and Zhou (2007) consider
a call center with high and low value calls, and evaluate routing schemes for outsourcing some of the low
values calls. Gurvich and Perry (2012) consider a service network operated under a threshold-type overflow
mechanism. If the waiting room is full, the call is overflowed to an outsourcer. The a priori outsourcing
considered in our article follows a similar routing scheme as theirs.
A third stream of literature related to this paper analyzes reservation strategy. In most studies, reservation
strategies are considered when two different job types, namely, inbound and outbound calls, have to be handled
by a unique group of agents, involving an analysis of call blended policies. Some papers focus on performance
evaluation, while others address analysis of blending policies or staffing decisions. Deslauriers et al. (2007)
developed various continuous Markov chain models for a call center with inbound and outbound calls. The
authors considered a threshold policy and characterized the rate of outbounds and the waiting time distribution
of inbounds. Gans and Zhou (2003) and Bhulai and Koole (2003) prove that a threshold policy on the number
of idle agents is optimal to maximize the outbound throughput under a service level constraint on inbound
waiting time, when inbound and outbound calls have the same service rate. Pang and Perry (2014) consider
a large call blending model and propose a logarithmic safety staffing rule, combined with a threshold control
policy to ensure that agents’ utilization is always close to one with idle agents always present. The common
point between most studies on reservation strategy is the use of a reservation threshold policy. In our paper,
we prove that such a policy is optimal when outsourcing decisions can be taken together with reservation
decisions. Combining these strategies extends the range of options for improving the system’s performance.
Our study shows that employing a unique reservation or outsourcing strategy is optimal only in extreme
workload situations.
In this article, we include the abandonment feature as an extension to our initial model. Queues with
abandonment have often been studied in order to evaluate the performance of a service system (Zeltyn and
Mandelbaum, 2005; Yao, 2016), or to make staffing and routing decisions (Mandelbaum and Zeltyn, 2007, 2009;
Koc¸ag˘a and Ward, 2010). However, in practice, queueing models without abandonment like the M/M/s queue
(Erlang-C) are often employed for management issues in call center operations (Koole, 2013). One reason,
revealed in the statistical analysis of Robbins et al. (2010), is that the Erlang-C formula gives a pessimistic
evaluation of call center performance and therefore results in safe managerial decisions. Thus, our findings on
the case without abandonment can be used to take routing decisions when abandonment is difficult to predict.
Predicting or anticipating abandonment is particularly challenging. Past waiting experiences (Emadi and
Swaminathan, 2017), customers’ beliefs and expectations (Veeraraghavan et al., 2018), delay announcements
(Aks¸in et al., 2013, 2016), and learning experience regarding the service speed while waiting (Cui et al., 2018)
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influence customers’ patience. The difficulty of capturing customers’ reasons when they abandon the queue
explains why abandonment is generally modeled as an exogenous parameter in most call center studies. In
particular, exponential distribution serves as a reference in the call center literature (Koole, 2013). Assuming a
memoryless distribution for abandonment might seem unrealistic. However, the statistical analysis by Brown
et al. (2005) showed the robustness of the M/M/s+M queue (Erlang-A) to fit performance measures reasonably
accurately. In this article, we also chose to model abandonment by an exponential distribution.
Finally, a specific feature of our queueing model under an a posteriori policy is that decisions are taken
based on the experienced waiting time of the oldest customer in the queue. While it is common in call centers
to use waiting time as a decision variable, the literature generally focuses on quantity-based policies where
the number of customers is the decision variable. This is often due to the difficulty of providing a Markov
chain analysis when the wait is the decision variable. To overcome this difficulty, Koole et al. (2012) created
a tool to develop Markov decision processes analysis where the first-in-line waiting time is used as a decision
variable. Later, Legros et al. (2017) extended this method to queueing models with abandonment. However,
complexity of the transition structure makes it complicated to prove the optimality of a threshold policy
using this method. In this paper, we tackle the issue by identifying new monotonicity properties of the value
function operator, with the first-in-line waiting time as a decision variable. This in turn allows us to prove the
optimality of a time-based threshold policy for our optimization problem. The proven monotonicity properties
are general and could be used in other queueing contexts involving time-based decisions.
2 The Model and the Routing Problem
Below, we provide the model description and the routing problem. Our assumptions are partly driven by the
actual problem that motivates the analysis, and partly by our concern to keep the model as simple as possible.
The idea is to obtain an easy-to-implement reservation and outsourcing policy, and to gain insights into the
environmental conditions that drive these routing decisions. We consider a system with a single pool of s
homogeneous agents and two types of calls, namely, inbound and outbound. We sometimes refer to inbound
calls as class-1 customers, and to outbound calls as class-2 (numbered in order of priority: class-1 customers
have non-preemptive priority over class-2 customers). Class-1 customers arrive at the system according to a
Poisson process with rate λ. If class-1 customers are not routed to the service immediately upon arrival, then
either they wait in an infinite capacity queue for their turn to be served, with customers being served in order
of arrival, or they are outsourced as explained below. Unlike class-1 customers, we assume that there is an
infinite supply of class-2 customers, so an available agent can always serve such a customer, if desired. The
service times of all class-i customers (i = 1, 2) are assumed to be exponential random variables with rate µ.
We denote by a the ratio between the arrival rate and the service rate; a = λµ .
The call center is engaged by a contract with an outsourcer, whereby a given proportion of class-1 customers,
PS , can be outsourced per time unit for a given fee, Couts. The call center may decide to outsource fewer calls
than the contract would allow. The proportion of outsourced calls in the contract should be chosen in a way as
to ensure the stability of the call center; λ(1− PS) < sµ. The call center’s revenue is generated by the service
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afforded to class-1 and class-2 customers. The revenue generated by the service of a class-2 customer, R2, is
random and depends on the customers’ heterogeneity. Therefore, the revenue generated by class-2 customers
per time unit is equal to R2×T , where T is the random throughput of served class-2 customers. Class-1 calls
service may also generate revenue. Unlike class-2 calls, class-1 calls may wait before being served. This wait,
denoted by WS , influences the callers’ willingness to accept a purchase offer (Gu¨nes¸ et al., 2010; Lu et al.,
2013). While callers’ delay sensitivity can be understood through an analysis of abandonment (Aks¸in et al.,
2013), the impact of waiting on purchase probability is not yet well understood in our context. Since customers
are initially seeking for a service, their wait may generate frustration from not achieving their goal. This type
of frustration may have detrimental consequences on satisfaction and loyalty as well as on the potential to
accept an unexpected purchase offer. Therefore, to simplify the analysis, we assume a decreasing and linear
relation between the revenue generated by the service for a class-1 call and its wait. The revenue from a
class-1 call is then R1(1 − ωWS), for ω ≥ 0, where R1 is a random variable independent of WS . In view of
the contract with the outsourcer, the long-run expected rate of served class-1 calls is λ(1−PS). The long-run
expected revenue per time unit, denoted by E(G), can thus be written as
E(G) = r2E(T ) + r1λ(1− PS)(1− ωE(WS))− Couts, (1)
where ri = E(Ri), for i = 1, 2, and where E(X) denotes the expected value of a given random variable, X.
The system manager has discretion regarding routing jobs to the various servers and to the outsourcer.
Treating the call center as a profit center, the system manager needs to choose a policy that maximizes the
expected revenue subject to a limitation for outsourcing a proportion of class-1 calls to the outsourcer. This
can be formulated as
{
maximize E(G),
subject to PS ≤ PS ,
(2)
where PS is the proportion of outsourced calls. It is reasonable (although not required) to expect that an
optimal policy to solve Problem (2) would be non-idling for class-1 customers in the sense that servers
may idle only if the queue is empty. The infinite number of class-2 customers could allow a full servers’
utilization. However, if all agents are constantly working, all class-1 customers will be delayed in the queue
before entering service. This can be avoided if there is idleness in the system, which can be controlled through
a reservation strategy. For outsourcing, two classes of policies are considered; a priori outsourcing and a
posteriori outsourcing. With a priori outsourcing, the decision to outsource a call is taken at customer’s
arrival. With a posteriori outsourcing, all calls are admitted into the system. The decision to outsource a call
is taken if the call has waited too long. We denote the set of policies for reservation and a priori outsourcing
by Ωe and the set of policies for reservation and a posteriori outsourcing by Ωl. The letters e and l refer to
early (a priori) or late (a posteriori) outsourcing respectively. Index e and l are also used to indicate whether
a policy pi belongs to Ωe or to Ωl. We attempt to determine the optimal policies in Ωe or Ωl, Policy pi
∗
e and
Policy pi∗l , and to compare between them. While the system manager is in a revenue-maximizing perspective,
service quality should also be reported when comparing the two policy classes for outsourcing. Thus, the wait
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of outsourced callers should not be ignored. Service quality is evaluated by the expected wait, denoted by
E(W ), of both outsourced and served in-house class-1 calls.
The setting described above allows us to prove the optimal outsourcing and reservation policy (Section 3),
and to compare the two policy classes (Section 4). However, some of our assumptions may seem too restrictive.
In Section 5, we thus propose investigating some extensions that generalize our analysis. First, we suggest
including customer abandonment in the model. We assume that a waiting class-1 customer has finite patience
and will abandon if the waiting time exceeds a random time that is exponentially distributed with mean 1/β.
In this case, the percentage of abandonment, PA, is considered as an additional measure of the call center’s
service quality. Second, we reconsider the relation between the wait and the purchase probability. In the
context of retail stores, Lu et al. (2013) show a negative correlation between customers’ sensitivity to waiting
and price sensitivity. Moreover, Ulku et al. (2017) demonstrate that the consumption quantity increases with
the wait. Therefore, customers who can withstand a long wait may consume more with a preference for cheaper
products. It is however difficult to conclude whether the revenue per served customer would increase with the
wait, especially in our context where customers do not have the initial intention to buy a product. Although
a positive relation between the wait and the purchase probability is less likely to happen, by investigating
the case ω < 0, our article also aims to provide a routing solution for this case. Finally, we reconsider the
assumption of equal service rates for class-1 and class-2 calls. The assumption of equal service rates makes
sense in a context where class-2 calls are performed from a list of waiting customers that are a subset of
customers who have previously phoned the call center. However, in other contexts, class-1 and class-2 calls
may be independent groups of customers with different service rates. To explore this issue, we assume that
the service times of all class-i customers are exponential random variables with rate µi, i = 1, 2.
We conclude our model description with three remarks. First, as mentioned above, the proportion of
outsourced calls in the contract, PS , is chosen such that the system is stable. Therefore, situations where the
optimization problem has no solution should not occur. However, due to mistakes in the forecasting of the
arrival rate, instability could happen. If customers are patient and the call center managers wish to avoid too
long waits, it is possible to decide for a penalty to pay per outsourced call in case the call center needs to
outsource more calls than what was initially decided in the contract. Analysis of this possibility in the contract
can be made in a similar way to the one studied in the present article and leads to similar conclusions. We
therefore decided not to pursue this analysis.
Second, when agents initiate outbound calls, customers may not pick up the phone directly. This waste
of capacity may be significant if agents initiate outbound calls only at service completion. One way to reduce
these idling times is to employ an automatic dialer. Specifically, at many modern outbound contact centers,
automatic dialers initiate outbound calls even when all agents are busy, using predictive dialing software with
the purpose of minimizing agents’ idling times (Pang and Perry (2014)). However, automatic dialers are not
perfect for estimating the remaining service time of an agent or a customer’s availability. Therefore, one
unintended consequence of using this software is to drop calls if there is no agent available or to call some
customers and make them wait before service. This extension will not be pursued here.
Finally, the arrival rate λ is assumed to be fixed. This is unrealistic since in most service systems, such as
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call centers, there is strong variation depending on the time of the day, promotional offers and the customers’
history. Moreover, the customers’ waiting experience may influence their future behavior with phenomena of
retention and acquisition that can affect the arrival rate in the long-run. However, for the real-time routing
operations considered in this article, these effects may be ignored. Moreover, if the arrival rate gradually
varies relative to the system dynamics, then the call center can be analyzed using a point-wise stationary
approximation, where performance at a given time is approximated by the steady state performance of the
stationary system with a constant arrival rate (Green and Kolesar, 1991; Jennings et al., 1996). Therefore,
the extension of a time-varying or a state-varying arrival rate will not be pursued here.
3 Optimal policy
In this section, we determine the optimal policy to maximize E(G) as defined in Equation (1) for each class of
policies for outsourcing (Ωe and Ωl). For this purpose, Section 3.1 proves the form of the optimal policy within
the sets Ωe and Ωl for a given proportion of outsourced calls. Section 3.2 provides the performance measures
and their monotonicity properties in the control parameters. This allows us to determine how the search for
the control parameters should be initiated. Section 3.3 explains how to compute the control parameters under
each policy in order to answer our optimization question.
3.1 Form of the optimal policy
We formulate the routing problem as a Markov decision process (MDP) and next use the value iteration
technique to prove the form of the optimal reservation and outsourcing policy. We formulate the problem via
the transition structure and the possible actions.
The transition structure. The two classes of policies for outsourcing (Ωe and Ωl) require different defini-
tions for the state space. For a policy in Ωe, let us denote a state of the system by x, where x ≥ −s. States
with −s ≤ x ≤ 0 correspond to an empty queue and s+ x busy agents. States with x > 0 correspond to the
number of class-1 calls waiting in the queue. The transition rate from state x to state x′ is denoted as tx,x′ .
So, for x, x′ ≥ −s, we have
tx,x′ =

λ, if x′ = x+ 1, x ≥ −s,
min(s, x+ s)µ, if x′ = x− 1, x > −s,
0, otherwise,
which corresponds to arrival and service departure rates.
For a policy in Ωl, the previous system state definition does not allow for decisions based on the experienced
waiting time of a given call. To overcome this difficulty, we decided to explicitly model the wait of the first
customer in line (FIL) in the queue as in Koole et al. (2012) and Legros et al. (2017). The approach consists
of discretizing the FIL waiting time using successive exponential phases, each with rate γ, and then report the
waiting phase in the Markov process. Having large values of γ improves the approximation as it gives a better
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representation of the continuously elapsing time. As γ tends to infinity, this approximate setup converges
to the original one, which leads to an exact analysis. Again, we denote a state of the system by x, where
x ≥ −s. States with −s ≤ x ≤ 0 correspond to an empty queue and s + x busy agents. States with x > 0
correspond to a situation where the FIL is waiting at phase x and all agents are busy. The corresponding
transition rate from state x to state x′ are denoted by tx,x′ . As Koole et al. (2012) suggested, the transition
probabilities denoted by qx,x−h from a waiting phase x to a waiting phase x− h, are qx,x−h =
(
λ
λ+γ
)(
γ
λ+γ
)h
and qx,0 =
(
γ
λ+γ
)x
for x > 0 and 0 ≤ h < x. So, for x, x′ ≥ −s, we may write
tx,x′ =

λ, if x′ = x+ 1,−s ≤ x ≤ 0,
γ, if x′ = x+ 1, x > 0,
(s+ x)µ, if x′ = x− 1,−s < x ≤ 0,
sµqx,x−h, if x′ = x− h, x > 0, and 0 ≤ h ≤ x,
0, otherwise,
which corresponds to arrival, service departure and time elapsed.
Possible actions. If the queue is empty, the possible actions for an agent just after a service completion
are either to remain idle or to initiate a class-2 call. For a policy in Ωe, the possible actions at the arrival of
a class-1 call when all agents are busy are either to accept the call in the queue or to outsource it from the
system. For a policy in Ωl, the possible actions after an elapsing of time of the FIL are either to maintain the
call in the queue or to outsource it from the system.
The value function formulation. For both policy classes, the maximal event rate is bounded. This renders
each system uniformizable. We assume without loss of generality that λ+ sµ = 1 for a policy in Ωe, and that
λ+ sµ+γ = 1 for a policy in Ωl such that the rate out of each state is equal to 1. We formulate a 2-step value
function, in order to separate transitions and actions. We define the dynamic programming value functions
Vk(x), Wk(x) and Uk(x) over k ≥ 0 steps, depending on the state of the system x, x ≥ −s. The operators
Uk and Wk are decision-making operators that represent the class-1 customer outsourcing decision and the
class-2 customer initiation decision respectively. We choose V0 = U0 = W0 = 0.
Our optimization problem corresponds to a constrained MDP. Constrained MDP’s can be solved using
various techniques. Here, we use one that introduces the constraint in the objective using a Lagrange multiplier,
denoted by L. Under weak conditions, it can be seen that the optimal stationary policy for a certain Lagrange
multiplier is optimal for the constrained problem if the value of the constraint under this policy attains exactly
the desired proportion of outsourced calls (Altman, 1999). This means that the Lagrange multiplier L controls
the proportion of outsourced calls PS and should be chosen such that E(G) is maximized.
The costs and rewards involved in E(G) are counted at service initiation or outsourcing epochs. For Ωe
and Ωl, service initiations occur at λ-transitions from states with vacant servers, and sµ-transitions from
states x > 0. From states with vacant servers (i.e., for −s ≤ x < 0), a call starting service does not wait.
Therefore, a reward of ri is counted per served class-i call, i = 1, 2. For Ωe, the waiting time of a class-1
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customer who starts service is difficult to estimate in state x > 0. However, since customers arrive one by one,
the queue length is identical, in distribution, at arrival times and at service initiation epochs. Just after a
service initiation from state x, the expected wait of an arriving customer is xsµ . So, a reward of r1
(
1− ω xsµ
)
is counted per class-1 call served from state x > 0. For Ωl, the expected duration of a waiting phase is 1/γ.
Therefore, a customer who starts service from state x > 0 has already waited xγ time units. So, a reward of
r1
(
1− ω xγ
)
is counted per class-1 call served from state x > 0. Finally, the cost L is counted per outsourced
call in Ωe and Ωl. We choose not to express Couts in the value function because this element is constant and
cannot be optimized. Therefore, it does not influence the routing decisions.
For Ωe, we may then write for k ≥ 0 and x ≥ −s,
Vk+1(x) =λUk(x) + min(s, s+ x)µ
(
Wk(x− 1) + r11x>0
(
1− ω x
sµ
))
+ (1− λ−min(s, s+ x)µ)Wk(x),
(3)
where the notation 1x∈A is used to express the indicator function of a given subset A, with
Uk(x) = Vk(x+ 1) + r1 if −s ≤ x < 0, and Uk(x) = max(Vk(x)− L, Vk(x+ 1)) if x ≥ 0,
Wk(x) = max(Vk(x), Vk(x+ 1) + r2) if −s ≤ x < 0, and Wk(x) = Vk(x) if x ≥ 0.
For Ωl, we denote by F the operator on the set of functions f from Z to R defined by F (f(x)) =
x∑
h=0
qx,x−hf(x − h) for x > 0, and F (f(x)) = f(x) for x ≤ 0. This operator is used to simplify the no-
tations. It represents the possible changes in the state of the FIL when either an outsourcing or a service
completion occurs. We may thus write, for k ≥ 0,
Vk+1(x) = λUk(x) + (s+ x)µWk(x− 1) + (1− λ− (s+ x)µ)Wk(x), for − s ≤ x ≤ 0, and, (4)
Vk+1(x) = γUk(x) + sµ
(
F (Wk(x)) + r1
(
1− ωx
γ
))
+ (1− γ − sµ)Wk(x), for x > 0, with
Uk(x) = Vk(x+ 1) + r1 if −s ≤ x < 0, and Uk(x) = max(F (Vk(x))− L, Vk(x+ 1)) if x ≥ 0,
Wk(x) = max(Vk(x), Vk(x+ 1) + r2) if −s ≤ x < 0, and Wk(x) = Vk(x) if x ≥ 0.
One way of obtaining the long-run average optimal actions is to use the value iteration technique, by
recursively evaluating Vk, for k ≥ 0. As k tends to infinity, the optimal policy converges to the unique average
optimal policy. Moreover, the optimal long-run policy is independent of the choice of V0. The convergence is
due to the aperiodic irreducible finite-state Markov chains considered here (e.g., see Theorem 8.5.3 part c of
Puterman (1994)). In Theorem 1, through induction on the value function, we prove that the optimal policy
for the two policy classes is of threshold type. For Ωe, we prove that the value function Vk is decreasing and
concave. For Ωl, we instead need to show that Vk(x+ 1)− F (Vk(x)) is decreasing in x for x ≥ 0. The latter
property is referred to as general concavity.
Theorem 1. The optimal policy for outsourcing and reservation within Ωe and Ωl is of threshold type.
Theorem 1 allows us to specify the formulation of the two optimal outsourcing policies and the optimal
reservation policy.
• Reservation threshold policy for Policies pi∗e and pi∗l
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We denote by c the threshold of number of agents reserved for class-1 customers, 0 ≤ c ≤ s. Consider
an idle agent just after a service completion. If the number of idle agents (excluding the idle agent
considered) is at least c, then this agent initiates the service of a class-2 customer. Otherwise, she
remains idle. In other words, there are c agents that are reserved for class-1 calls, so, there are at least
s− c agents working at any time.
• Call outsourcing policies
- a priori outsourcing threshold policy (for Policy pi∗e). The decision to allow an arriving class-1
call to join the queue is based on the current number of customers in the queue when all agents are
busy. If this number is strictly lower than a certain threshold n (n ≥ 0) and all agents are busy, then
the arriving class-1 customer is allowed to join the queue. Otherwise, it is outsourced by the system.
- a posteriori outsourcing threshold policy (for Policy pi∗l ). With outsourcing a posteriori, all
class-1 customers are allowed to join the queue, regardless of the system state. However, the system does
not allow class-1 calls to infinitely stay in the queue. A call waiting in the queue for exactly τ (τ ≥ 0)
time units is automatically outsourced.
3.2 Performance evaluation
We now evaluate the performance measures which constitute the expected cost, E(G), and the expected
waiting time, E(W ) for Policy pi∗e and Policy pi
∗
l . In addition, we evaluate the waiting time distribution of
served customers, P (WS > t), for t ≥ 0. The latter performance will be considered in Section 4 to compare
the two policy types. To express the performance measures, we use similar building blocks as in Zeltyn and
Mandelbaum (2005); , J , J1, JH , and J(t) . These building blocks were used to express abandonment
behavior. In our model, we instead consider outsourcing control which cannot be wholly assimilated with
abandonment behavior. This explains why we do not have a common expression for P (WS > t) for the two
policy classes and why J(0) 6= J for Policy pi∗e . The performance measures are given by
PS =
1 + (λ− sµ)J
+ λJ
, E(T ) = λ
(s−1c )
ac/c!
+ λJ
, E(W ) =
λJH
+ λJ
, and, E(WS) =
sµJ1 − J
+ sµJ − 1 ,
where the notation
(
n
k
)
is used to express the binomial coefficient with integer parameters n and k (0 ≤ k ≤ n).
Finally, for t > 0, we have
P (WS > t) =
λJ(t)
+ sµJ − 1 , for Policy pi
∗
e , and, P (WS > t) =
λJ(t)− 1− (λ− sµ)J
+ sµJ − 1 ,
for Policy pi∗l . For both policy classes, we have
 =
c−1∑
x=0
ax
(s−c+x)!
ac−1
(s−1)!
.
In Table 1, we specify the other building blocks. The derivation of the performance measures follows from
a Markov chain analysis. For Policy pi∗l , the approximated model is considered. We next obtain the exact
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Table 1: Building blocks
With Policy pi∗e : With Policy pi
∗
l :
J 1sµ
1−( as )
n+1
1−a/s
1
sµ
1− as e−τ(sµ−λ)
1−a/s
J1
1
(sµ)2
1−(n+2)( as )
n+1
+(n+1)( as )
n+2
(1−a/s)2
1
(sµ)2
1−(1+(1− as )(1+sµτ)) as e−τ(sµ−λ)
(1−a/s)2
JH
1
(sµ)2
1−(n+1)(a/s)n+n(a/s)n+1
(1−a/s)2
1
(sµ)2
1−(1+ as τ(sµ−λ))e−τ(sµ−λ)
(1−a/s)2
J(t) 1sµ
e−sµt
1−a/s
n−1∑
x=0
(sµt)x((a/s)x−(a/s)n)
x! 1t<τ
1
sµ
e−t(sµ−λ)− as e−τ(sµ−λ)
1−a/s
performance measures by letting the elapsing of time rate, γ, tend to infinity. The details of this analysis are
omitted. The computation of the optimal thresholds is based on the monotonicity properties of the performance
measures as given in Theorem 2. When the second order monotonicity property is not specified, it means
that the performance considered is neither convex nor concave. The results of Theorem 2 are also interesting
from a queueing perspective. With c = s, our model is reduced to a Markovian queue with deterministic
reneging under Policy pi∗l -referred to in the queueing literature as the M/M/s+D queue- or to a finite capacity
Markovian queue under Policy pi∗e -referred to in the queueing literature as the M/M/s/s+n queue-. The
convexity results obtained allow us to retrieve existing results for the M/M/s/s+n queue and to derive new
results for the M/M/s+D queue.
Theorem 2. The following holds:
• The expected throughput of class-2 customers, E(T ), is decreasing in c and decreasing and convex in n
(Policy pi∗e) and in τ (Policy pi
∗
l ),
• The proportion of outsourced callers, PS, is decreasing and convex in c and decreasing and convex in n
(Policy pi∗e) and in τ (Policy pi
∗
l ),
• The expected waiting time of served class-1 customers, E(WS), the expected waiting of served and out-
sourced customers, E(W ), and the proportion of served callers who wait more than t, P (WS > t), are
decreasing and convex in c and increasing in n (Policy pi∗e) and in τ (Policy pi
∗
l ).
Given that PS is decreasing in the outsourcing thresholds, the PS ≤ PS relation induces a relation between
the outsourcing and the reservation thresholds. We obtain
n ≥
ln
PS · 1+(1−a/s)
c−1∑
x=0
s!
(s−c+x)!ac−x
1− as (1−PS)

ln (a/s)
, for Policy pi∗e , and τ ≥ −
ln
PS · 1+(1−a/s)
c−1∑
x=0
s!
(s−c+x)!ac−x
1− as (1−PS)

sµ− λ , (5)
for Policy pi∗l . Inequality (5) will be used in Section 3.3 to initiate the algorithm for the computation of the
optimal thresholds.
Special Case: When inbound callers are insensitive to their wait (i.e., ω = 0). Using Theorem 2,
Proposition 1 reveals that when callers’ purchase willingness is insensitive to their waiting time (i.e., ω = 0),
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then reservation should be excluded. In other words, agents should work full time on inbound or outbound
calls.
Proposition 1. When ω = 0, the following holds:
• If as ≥ 1, or if as < 1 and r2 > r1, then it is optimal to have c = 0, and n =
ln
(
P
S
1− a
s (1−PS)
)
ln(a/s) for Policy
pi∗e or τ = −
ln
(
P
S
1− a
s (1−PS)
)
sµ−λ for Policy pi
∗
l .
• Otherwise, if as < 1 and r2 ≤ r1, then it is optimal to have c = 0 and n = τ =∞.
3.3 Computation of the optimal policy
The constraint PS ≤ PS indicates that the proportion of outsourced calls should be optimized in the interval
[0, PS ]. Therefore, in Equations (3) and (4) of Section 3.1, several values for the Lagrange multiplier L
should be tested until the maximal expected revenue is reached. This procedure might be long given that for
each chosen value of L, we should let k tend to infinity in Equations (3) and (4). Instead, we adopted an
algorithmic approach where only a finite number of thresholds is tested before reaching their optimal values.
For the reservation threshold, c, an exhaustive evaluation is possible since the threshold c can only take s+ 1
values. These values are the integers in the interval [0, s]. However, for the outsourcing thresholds, n or τ , an
infinite number of values is possible. This renders an exhaustive search inapplicable.
To overcome this difficulty, we formulate an n-terminating problem as in Koc¸ag˘a and Ward (2010) and
Adusumilli and Hasenbein (2010). This consists of expressing the long-run dynamic programming optimality
equations for the relative value function, V c(x), for x ≥ −c and the average constant E(G)c for a given
reservation threshold, c, under both policy classes. At this step, we do not consider the constraint PS ≤ PS .
Therefore, we chose L = 0. For Policy pi∗l , we consider the approximated model used in Section 3.1. Under
both policies, we have
V c(−c) + E(G)c = λ(V c(−c+ 1) + r1) + (s− c)µr2 + (1− λ)V c(−c), for x = −c, (6)
V c(x) + E(G)c = λ(V c(x+ 1) + r1) + (s+ x)µV
c(x− 1) + (1− λ− (s+ x)µ)V c(x), for − c < x < 0,
V c(0) + E(G)c = λmax(V c(1), V c(0)) + sµV c(−1) + (1− λ− sµ)V c(0), for x = 0.
For x > 0, and Policy pi∗e , we have
V c(x) + E(G)c = λmax(V c(x+ 1), V c(x)) + sµ
(
V c(x− 1) + r1
(
1− ω x
sµ
))
+ (1− λ− sµ)V c(x).
For x > 0, and Policy pi∗l , we have
V c(x) + E(G)c = γmax(V c(x+ 1), F (V c(x))) + sµ
(
F (V c(x)) + r1
(
1− ωx
γ
))
+ (1− γ − sµ)V c(x).
We introduce the relative cost difference defined as ∆c(x) = V c(x) − V c(x − 1) for Policy pi∗e and ∆c(x) =
V c(x)− F (V c(x− 1)) for Policy pi∗l , for x > −c. For Policy pi∗l , using the notation u = λλ+γ , we have
V c(x)− F (V c(x)) = V c(x)−
x−1∑
k=0
u(1− u)kV c(x− k)− (1− u)xV c(0) = (1− u)∆c(x),
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for x > 0. Subsequently, we rewrite Equation (6) in terms of ∆c(x). Under both policies, we may write
E(G)c − g(x) = λ∆c(x+ 1)− (s+ x)µ∆c(x), for − c ≤ x < 0, (7)
E(G)c − g(0) = λmax(∆c(1), 0)− sµ∆c(0), for x = 0,
E(G)c − g(x) = λmax(∆c(x+ 1), 0)− sµ∆c(x), for Policy pi∗e , and x > 0,
E(G)c − g(x) = γmax(∆c(x+ 1), 0)− (sµ+ γ)(1− u)∆c(x), for Policy pi∗l , and x > 0,
with ∆c(−c) = 0, and where g(x) is the reward function defined as
g(x) =

λr1 + (s− c)µr2, for x = −c,
λr1, for − c < x < 0,
0, for x = 0,
sµr1
(
1− ω x
sµ
)
for Policy pi∗e , and sµr1
(
1− ωx
γ
)
for Policy pi∗l , for x > 0.
(8)
Theorem 1 proves that the optimal policy for call outsourcing is of threshold type. Therefore, the solution
of Equation (7) is given by the relative difference ∆c,n(x), for −c ≤ x ≤ n, and the expected revenue E(G)c,n
both depending on the reservation threshold, c, and on the outsourcing threshold, n, such that for both policies
we have
E(G)c,n − g(x) = λ∆c,n(x+ 1)− (s+ x)µ∆c,n(x), for − c ≤ x ≤ 0, (9)
E(G)c,n − g(x) = λ∆c,n(x+ 1)− sµ∆c,n(x), for Policy pi∗e , and 0 < x ≤ n,
E(G)c,n − g(x) = γ∆c,n(x+ 1)− (sµ+ γ)(1− u)∆c,n(x), for Policy pi∗l , and 0 < x ≤ n,
where ∆c,n(−c) = ∆c,n(n + 1) = 0. Recall that for Policy pi∗l , the outsourcing threshold is a positive real, τ .
In Equation (9), we approximate the deterministic duration, τ , by an Erlang distribution with n phases and
rate γ per phase. By relating n and τ via nγ = τ , this Erlang distribution converges to the deterministic one
as n and γ tend to infinity. In this way, the same notation, n, can be used for both policies.
The relations in (9) define a system of linear equations which can be solved explicitly. Using an induction
step, we can show after some algebra that
∆c,n(−c+ x) =
(
E(G)c,n
λ
− r1
) x−1∑
i=0
a−i(s− c+ x− 1)!
(s− c+ x− 1− i)! − r2
a−x(s− c+ x− 1)!
(s− c− 1)! ,
for 1 ≤ x ≤ c, for Policy pi∗e and Policy pi∗l . For Policy pi∗e , for x > 0, we obtain
∆c,n(x) =
E(G)c,n
λ
(a
s
)1−x( c∑
i=0
a−is!
(s− i)! +
a
s
1− (as )x−1
1− as
)
− r2
(a
s
)1−x a−(c+1)s!
(s− c− 1)! (10)
− r1
(a
s
)1−x( c∑
i=1
a−is!
(s− i)! +
1− (as )x−1
1− as
− ω
sµ
1− x (as )x−1 + (x− 1) (as )x(
1− as
)2
)
.
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For Policy pi∗l , we introduce the notation aγ = s
λ+γ
sµ+γ . For x > 0, we get
∆c,n(x) =
E(G)c,n
λ
(aγ
s
)1−x( c∑
i=0
a−is!
(s− i)! +
(
1 +
λ
γ
)
a
s
1− (aγs )x−1
1− as
)
− r2
(aγ
s
)1−x a−(c+1)s!
(s− c− 1)! (11)
− r1
(aγ
s
)1−x( c∑
i=1
a−is!
(s− i)! +
sµ
γ
aγ
s
1− (aγs )x−1
1− aγs
− ω
γ
aγ
s
1− x (aγs )x−1 + (x− 1) (aγs )x(
1− aγs
)2
)
.
The expected revenue, E(G)c,n, can be obtained by solving ∆c,n(n + 1) = 0. This allows us to retrieve the
expression of E(G) in Section 3.2 directly for Policy pi∗e and after letting γ and n tend to infinity for Policy
pi∗l .
Using the result of Lemma 1, Theorem 3 proves that the first local maximum of E(G)c,n found by increasing
n is the optimal outsourcing threshold.
Lemma 1. If E(G)c,n1 ≥ E(G)c,n2 for n1, n2 ∈ N, then
∆c,n1(x) ≥ ∆c,n2(x), for − c+ 1 ≤ x ≤ min(n1, n2) + 1. (12)
Theorem 3. If there exists a solution to Equation (9) with E(G)c,m > E(G)c,k, for 0 ≤ k ≤ m − 1 and
E(G)c,m+1 < E(G)c,m, then for all n > m, we have E(G)c,m ≥ E(G)c,n.
We may encounter a situation where E(G)c,n is increasing in n. This means that it is optimal to serve all
inbound calls in-house. In this case, in Proposition 2, we provide a stopping criterion for the search for the
optimal outsourcing threshold.
Proposition 2. If E(G)c,n is increasing in n, then E(G)c,∞ − E(G)c,n ≤ λ∆c,n(n), for Policy pi∗e , and
E(G)c,∞ − E(G)c,n ≤ γ∆c,n(n), for Policy pi∗l .
We are now in a position to establish an algorithm to compute the optimal outsourcing threshold. Inequality
(5) allows us to determine, for each reservation threshold c, the lowest possible outsourcing threshold such
that the constraint PS ≤ PS is satisfied. Moreover, Theorem 2 proves that PS is decreasing in the outsourcing
thresholds. Therefore, by increasing n, the constraint PS ≤ PS remains satisfied. While increasing the
outsourcing threshold, the result of Theorem 3 indicates that the first local maximum for the expected revenue
is also the global one. In the increasing case, Proposition 2 provides a stopping criterion for the search of the
optimal outsourcing threshold. Therefore, for each c, we can determine the optimal outsourcing threshold, nc,
after a finite number of iteration. The optimal reservation threshold, c, is then c∗ = arg max
c=0,1··· ,s
E(G)c,nc .
The algorithm is as follows:
Algorithm 1: Computation of the optimal outsourcing threshold for reservation threshold c.
1. Initialisation. Set nc as the lowest integer such that Inequality (5) is respected and compute E(G)
c,nc ,
E(G)c,∞, and ∆c,nc(nc) using (10) or (11).
2. Iteration step: Increase nc by one and compute E(G)
c,nc and ∆c,nc(nc) using (10) or (11).
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If E(G)c,nc < E(G)c,nc−1, then the outsourcing threshold nc − 1 is optimal.
If E(G)c,nc ≥ E(G)c,nc−1, then
• If E(G)c,∞ − E(G)c,n ≤ λ∆c,n(n) for Policy pi∗e , or E(G)c,∞ − E(G)c,n ≤ γ∆c,n(n) for Policy pi∗l ,
then it is optimal not to outsource any customer (i.e., nc =∞ is optimal).
• Otherwise, go back to the Iteration step.
4 Comparison between outsourcing policies
The main result is that Policy pi∗l outperforms Policy pi
∗
e for Problem (2). This result is proven in Theorem
4. The first point of Theorem 4 is given to qualify our main result. Although Policy pi∗l outperforms Policy
pi∗e from a revenue maximizer perspective, the improvement is detrimental to the quality of service measured
by E(W ) of both served and outsourced customers when the two policy classes have the same reservation
threshold and the same proportion of outsourced calls.
Theorem 4.
1. For a given reservation threshold and a given proportion of outsourced calls, the random variable WS is
highest for Policy pi∗e under the usual stochastic ordering and the expected waiting time of all customers
(served in-house or outsourced), E(W ), is lowest for Policy pi∗e .
2. E(G) is maximized for Policy pi∗l .
In the following illustrations, we provide some numerical experiments to compare Policy pi∗e and Policy pi
∗
l .
The aim is to determine in which contexts the difference between the two policy classes may be significant.
Effect of the congestion. In Figure 1, we evaluate the two policies in terms of expected revenue, expected
waiting time, and proportion of outsourced calls as functions of the class-1 arrival rate. As the workload
increases, the difference between the two policies also increases (Figure 1(a)). This can be explained by the
increase in the proportion of outsourced calls (Figure 1(b)). Figure 1(b) also reveals that the proportion of
outsourced calls is very close under the two policies. This information, taken together with the observation
of very close reservation thresholds under the two policies, indicates that the conditions of the first point of
Theorem 4 are close to be respected in most cases. This validates the idea that Policy pi∗l is detrimental to the
service quality measured by E(W ). Note that counterexamples can be found with very low arrival rates (see
Figure 1(c) for λ = 2). As shown in Figures 1(c) and 1(d), the difference between the two policies for E(W )
and E(WS) is not monotonous as a function of the arrival rate. We should recall that the optimal control
parameters are chosen to optimize E(G) and not E(W ). This explains the irregular behavior of E(W ) as a
function of λ. In some situations, the control parameters are chosen to encourage the service of class-2 calls,
with longer waits for class-1 customers, while in other situations, class-1 calls are given shorter wait times,
and the service initiation of class-2 calls is restricted. We observe however that the difference between the two
policies tends to increase with workload in high workload situations.
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(d) E(WS)
Figure 1: Comparison between the two policy classes (s = 10, µ = 1, r1 = 3, r2 = 1, ω = 1,
Couts
λPS
= 1/2,
PS = 30%)
Effect of the call center size. Table 2 compares the expected revenue, E(G), and the expected wait, E(W ),
for the two policy classes and different call center sizes. We chose a/s = 0.8, 1 and 1.2 to reflect different
congestion situations. Columns 5 and 6 give the relative difference in revenue, RDG, defined as RDG =
E(G)Policy pi∗l
−E(G)Policy pi∗e
|E(G)Policy pi∗e |
, and the absolute difference in revenue, ADG, defined as ADG = E(G)Policy pi∗l −
E(G)Policy pi∗e . Columns 7 and 8 provide the expected revenue generated per agent and per time unit. The
last three columns specify the expected wait and the absolute difference in service quality, ADW , defined as
ADW = E(W )Policy pi∗l − E(W )Policy pi∗e . We also specify the cost per outsourced call if the constraint in the
contract is saturated; Couts
λPS
. The table reveals that the difference in revenue between the two outsourcing
Table 2: Performance comparison (µ = 1, r1 = 3, r2 = 1, ω = 1,
Couts
λPS
= 1/2, PS = 20%)
Parameters E(G) E(G)
s
E(W )
a/s s Policy pi∗l Policy pi
∗
e RDG ADG Policy pi
∗
l Policy pi
∗
e Policy pi
∗
l Policy pi
∗
e ADW
0.8 1 0.94 0.48 94.178% 0.454 0.94 0.48 0.741 0.566 0.175
1 1 -0.39 -1.28 69.850% 0.897 -0.39 -1.28 1.483 1.195 0.288
1.2 1 -9.25 -11.74 21.218% 2.491 -9.25 -11.74 4.766 4.027 0.739
0.8 10 21.67 21.39 1.339% 0.286 2.17 2.14 0.058 0.039 0.019
1 10 23.75 23.21 2.335% 0.542 2.38 2.32 0.048 0.025 0.024
1.2 10 18.04 15.83 13.943% 2.207 1.80 1.58 0.400 0.335 0.065
0.8 50 120.39 120.24 0.124% 0.149 2.41 2.40 0.021 0.020 0.001
1 50 132.23 131.77 0.347% 0.458 2.64 2.64 0.022 0.018 0.004
1.2 50 138.19 136.62 1.144% 1.563 2.76 2.73 0.014 0.008 0.007
0.8 200 497.79 497.78 0.001% 0.004 2.49 2.49 0.000 0.000 0.000
1 200 553.93 553.09 0.153% 0.844 2.77 2.77 0.008 0.007 0.001
1.2 200 567.13 565.71 0.251% 1.421 2.84 2.83 0.006 0.005 0.002
0.8 400 1001.79 1001.79 0.000% 0.000 2.50 2.50 0.000 0.000 0.000
1 400 1122.59 1122.13 0.042% 0.468 2.81 2.81 0.002 0.001 0.000
1.2 400 1141.73 1140.47 0.110% 1.260 2.85 2.85 0.004 0.002 0.001
policies is significant (i) in small call centers, (ii) in congested situations, and (iii) when the proportion of
19
outsourced customers chosen is high. In large call centers, the effect of the service time variability is reduced,
and agents have greater efficiency as shown in Columns 7 and 8. Customers’ wait is thus better controlled,
and the relative improvement obtained by choosing a good routing strategy is reduced. As shown in the last
three columns, the difference in service quality is also the most substantial in small call centers. In large call
centers, the control parameters are adjusted in a way which cancels the wait.
This analysis allows us to specify the domain of applicability of our study. With more than 50 agents
present, the two policies are virtually the same. The improvement which can be obtained by implementing
Policy pi∗l instead of Policy pi
∗
e is marginal with less than 1% difference. This means that the results of our
study mostly reflect small call centers or call centers organized in small independent teams. Examples of
small-size call centers organization can be found for helpdesks of very specialized services, where agents might
need special tools to solve the client’s problems. In banks also, the management of large accounts requires
small teams of specially trained agents. In general, in the Business-to-Business environment, call centers are
usually small as compared to the Business-to-Consumer sector (Chevalier and Van den Schrieck, 2008). For
management reasons, some large call centers choose to be organized in smaller teams with identical skills.
Although the beneficial pooling effect is reduced in smaller systems, the human resource management can
be performed in a much better way. Agents’ motivation and responsibility would increase. For instance
Bouygues Telecom decided to adopt a small-team organization. For this call center, the number of agents
simultaneously present is in the order of 1000 and the corresponding number of agents present in each team
would be ranging from 20 to 50 (Jouini et al., 2008). Our study provides a valuable decision-support tool for
managing outsourcing and reservation decisions for this type of environment.
Routing solutions for extreme workload situations. We now focus further on extreme workload cases.
This analysis may help to explain routing practices commonly adopted in call centers. In Table 3, using Taylor
expansions, we provide equivalent expressions of the performance measures when a is in the neighborhood of
∞ and in the neighborhood of 0. Let us start with high workload situations. In both policy classes, PS is
Table 3: Equivalent expressions of the performance measures
a is in the neighborhood of ∞ a is in the neighborhood of 0
Policy pi∗e Policy pi
∗
l Policy pi
∗
e Policy pi
∗
l
E(T ) µ(s−c)s!s
n
(s−c)! a
−(c+n) µ(s−c)s!
(s−c)! a
−ce−τ(sµ−λ) µ(s− c)
PS
[
c∑
x=0
s!
(s−c+x)!ac−x
]−1
(s−c)!
s!sn a
c+n (s−c)!
s! a
ce−τsµ
E(WS)
n
sµ τ
1
sµ
(s−c)!ac
s!
insensitive to the outsourcing threshold. Moreover, E(T ) is decreasing and E(WS) is increasing in n (Policy
pi∗e) and in τ (Policy pi
∗
l ). Therefore, the outsourcing thresholds should be chosen as low as possible. For this
purpose, the constraint for the proportion of outsourced calls should be saturated (i.e., PS = PS) as observed
in Figure 1(b).
We now consider low workload situations. For both policies, E(T ) and all the performance measures related
to the waiting time are only controlled by c. The only measure that depends on the outsourcing parameters
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is PS . Since PS is decreasing in n and in τ , n =∞ and τ =∞ are optimal (no outsourcing). In Proposition
3, we show that either c = 0 or c = 1 is optimal.
Proposition 3. For Policy pi∗e or Policy pi
∗
l in low workload situations, n = ∞ or τ = ∞ is optimal and if
µr2 ≥ as r1ω, then c = 0 is optimal. Otherwise, c = 1 is optimal.
Therefore, in low workload situations, it is not optimal to outsource calls and reservation should be limited
to one agent at most. This result is intuitive; with too many agents there is no need to outsource and
reservation should be limited. The reason why c = 0 is not necessarily optimal is because with c = 0 all class-1
callers have to wait. So, even in a low workload situation, if the service times are long it might be beneficial
to have at least one idle agent to avoid waiting.
This analysis of extreme workload situations may partially confirm some common intuitions in call center
management. Reservation and outsourcing do not seem to meet the same environmental conditions. Initiating
outbound calls is generally considered by managers as a way to use overstaffing capacity. With too many
resources, outsourcing no longer appears useful. Instead, outsourcing is used to better manage congested
situations when the call center’s resources cannot handle the flow of arriving customers.
5 Robustness of the analysis
This section develops different natural extensions of the initial model. Section 5.1 considers the feature of
abandonment. Section 5.2 explores the consequences of the wait having a positive impact on purchase behavior
in a context of abandonment. Section 5.3 evaluates the impact of having different service rates for class-1 and
class-2 customers. The idea is to determine whether the conclusion of Section 4 is still valid in these different
settings.
5.1 Impact of abandonment
We now add the abandonment feature to the model. We assume that the patience of each customer in the
queue is exponentially distributed with rate β. This changes the MDP formulation of Section 3.1. For Ωe with
abandonment, the total event rate, λ + sµ + xβ, is an unbounded function of the system state. Therefore,
uniformization does not apply for the original model. To overcome this difficulty, we truncated the system
with parameter N , such that the maximal event rate, λ + sµ + Nβ, is bounded. This parameter should be
chosen as high as possible so that any further increase of N does not impact the policy obtained and the
expected revenue, E(G). As in Section 3.1, we assume that λ+ sµ+Nβ = 1. Equation (3) becomes
Vk+1(x) =λUk(x) + min(s, s+ x)µ
(
Wk(x− 1) + r11x>0
(
1− ω x
sµ
))
+ xβ1x>0Wk(x− 1) (13)
+ (1− λ−min(s, s+ x)µ− xβ1x>0)Wk(x),
for k ≥ 0 and −s ≤ x ≤ N , where the operators Uk and Wk are defined as in Section 3.1 for x < N . We
chose Wk(N) = Vk(N) and Uk(N) = Vk(N)−L, such that a rejection from state N is seen as an outsourcing
decision.
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For Ωl with abandonment, we used the approximation model developed in a previous contribution (Legros
et al., 2017). The idea is to approximate the abandonment distribution by a homogeneous Coxian distribution
evolving with rate γ. The purpose of this method is to have a uniformizable MDP with decisions based on
the experienced wait. From Theorem 2 in Section 4 of Legros et al. (2017), the transition probabilities from
waiting phase x > 0 to a lower waiting phase, x− h, for 0 ≤ h ≤ x, are given by
qx,0 =
x∏
k=1
(
1 +
λ
γ
(
γ
γ + β
)k)−1
, and, qx,x−h =
λ
γ
(
γ
γ + β
)x−h x∏
k=x−h
(
1 +
λ
γ
(
γ
γ + β
)k)−1
.
Therefore, for k ≥ 0, and x > 0, the second line of Equation (4) is changed to
Vk+1(x) = γ
γ
γ + β
Uk(x) + γ
β
γ + β
F (Wk(x)) + sµ
(
F (Wk(x)) + r1
(
1− ωx
γ
))
+ (1− γ − sµ)Wk(x). (14)
Using the value iteration technique, we find that the long-run optimal policy (i.e., as k tends to infinity)
for outsourcing and reservation is of threshold type as defined in Section 3.1. However, the value iteration
technique does not allow us to prove this result. Contrary to the case without abandonment, the monotonicity
properties of the value function which define a threshold policy are not valid for each k. For Ωe, the concavity
property at x = 0 can be broken for some k if β > µ. Note that the condition µ ≥ β was also found to be a
limitation for proving other second order monotonicity properties in the system parameters for the M/M/s+M
queue (e.g., see Theorem 3 in Armony et al. (2009)). For Ωl, the difficulty lies in the transition probabilities,
qx,x−h, for 0 ≤ h ≤ x, and x > 0. Without abandonment, in the proof of Theorem 1, we used the property
qx+1,x+1−h = qx,x−h, for 0 ≤ h < x, to show the propagation of the general concavity property in x. This
equality is broken with abandonment which prevents proving the induction step.
Interestingly, the n−terminating approach in Section 3.2 for computing the optimal outsourcing thresholds
is valid. More precisely, the results in Lemma 1, Theorem 3 and Proposition 2 can be extended to the case
with abandonment. This can be seen by rewriting the relative difference, ∆c(x) in Equation (7) and ∆c,n(x)
in Equation (9) with abandonment, for x > 0. For Policy pi∗e , we obtain,
E(G)c − g(x) = λmax(∆c(x+ 1), 0)− (sµ+ xβ)∆c(x), for 0 < x < N, (15)
E(G)c,n − g(x) = λ∆c,n(x+ 1)− (sµ+ xβ)∆c,n(x), for 0 < x ≤ n ≤ N,
with ∆c,n(n+ 1) = 0. For Ωl, for x > 0, note that qx,k = (1− qx,x)qx−1,k, for x > 1 and 0 ≤ k ≤ x− 1. Thus,
we have V (x)−F (V (x)) = (1− qx,x)(V (x)−F (V (x− 1))). Therefore, Equations (7) and (9) can be rewritten
as
E(G)c − g(x) = γ γ
γ + β
max(∆c(x+ 1), 0)− (1− qx,x)
(
sµ+ γ
β
γ + β
)
∆c(x), for, x > 0, (16)
E(G)c,n − g(x) = γ γ
γ + β
∆c,n(x+ 1)− (1− qx,x)
(
sµ+ γ
β
γ + β
)
∆c,n(x), for 0 < x ≤ n,
with ∆c,n(n + 1) = 0. Equations (15) and (16) can be used to extend the proofs of Section 3.2 to the case
with abandonment. The only change in the proofs is the definition of the modified problem with threshold
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level m for Theorem 3 and Proposition 2. Instead of assuming that the transition rates are identical between
the original and the modified problem, we chose to have the transition rates constant in the modified problem
for x > m and equal to their value in the original problem at x = m+ 1.
Consequently, Algorithm 1 can be used to obtain the optimal reservation and outsourcing thresholds
by solving Equations (15) and (16) numerically. There remains to provide the performance measures for
initiating the algorithm and facilitating the comparison between the two policy classes. For Policy pi∗e , a
Markov chain analysis can lead to the performance measures. For Policy pi∗l , the combination of abandonment
and outsourcing can be seen as a global reneging behavior, where the reneging behavior is the minimum
between a deterministic threshold τ and an exponential duration with parameter β. This allows us to adjust
some of the results of Zeltyn and Mandelbaum (2005) to our model. As for the case without abandonment, the
details of the performance measures’ computation are omitted. As in Section 3.3, we express the performance
measures as functions of certain building blocks. For both policy classes, we have
E(T ) = λ
(s−1c )
ac/c!
+ λJ
, E(W ) =
λJH
+ λJ
, and, PA = β
λJH
+ λJ
.
For Policy pi∗e , we have PS =
λI
+λJ , and E(WS) =
λJ1
+λ(J−I)−λβJH . For Policy pi
∗
l , we have PS =
1+(λ−sµ)J−λβJH
+λJ ,
and E(WS) =
sµJ1−J
+sµJ−1 . The building block  is identical to that of Section 3.2. In Table 4, we specify the
other building blocks with abandonment. The building block J1 cannot be expressed explicitly. Consequently,
Table 4: Building blocks
Policy pi∗e Policy pi
∗
l
I λ
n
n∏
i=0
(sµ+iβ)
−
J
n∑
k=0
λk
k∏
i=0
(sµ+iβ)
1
sµ +
∞∑
k=1
λk
(
1−e
λ
β
(1−e−βτ )−(sµ+kβ)τ
)
k∏
i=0
(sµ+iβ)
J1
1
sµ+β
n−1∑
k=0
(k+1)( λsµsµ+β )
k
k∏
i=0
(sµ+iβ)
∫ ∞
0
xe
λ
β (1−e−βmin(x,τ))−sµxdx
JH
n∑
k=1
kλk−1
k∏
i=0
(sµ+iβ)
1
β
J − e−(sµ+β)τ+λβ (1−e−βτ )
 1
sµ +
∞∑
k=0
λk(1−e−kβτ )
k+1∏
i=1
(sµ+iβ)

the expected revenue which involves J1 must be calculated numerically and the comparison between the two
policy classes can only be made numerically.
Figure 2 compares the two policy classes. This confirms the result of Section 4 which states that Policy
pi∗l outperforms Policy pi
∗
e in terms of revenue, but is detrimental to service quality (measured here by the
percentage of abandonment). Nevertheless, the difference between the two policies is reduced with highly
impatient customers. As in Figure 1, we observe that the difference between the two policies increases with
the arrival rate. However, this observation is valid only up to a certain arrival rate. When the arrival rate is
very high compared to service capacity, the difference between the two policies decreases with the arrival rate,
because the efficiency-driven regime is reached (Whitt, 2004). For this regime, the threshold c is irrelevant as
agents have no opportunity to initiate a class-2 call since the queue is never empty. Under both policy classes,
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(b) PA
Figure 2: Comparison between the two policy classes (s = 10, µ = 1, r1 = 3, r2 = 1,
Couts
λPS
= 1/2, ω = 1,
PS = 20%, β = 1)
the proportion of served customers is equal to sµλ and the expected waiting time of served customers is
ln( λsµ )
β .
This renders the expected revenue identical under both policies.
5.2 When the wait has a positive impact
We also explored the case where waiting has a positive impact on purchase behavior. For this purpose, we
assume that ω < 0. In this way, the longer customers wait before being served, the more likely they are to
accept the purchase offer. Without abandonment, the manager should choose an understaffing level such that
λ > sµ and should not outsource any call. In this way, the wait and the expected revenue would be infinite.
This situation is, however, unlikely to happen since callers would not wait infinitely. With abandonment,
letting customers wait a long time increases the revenue per served caller but reduces the number of callers
who accept to stay in the queue. Therefore, allowing customers to wait a long time is not necessarily beneficial.
Using the tools developed for the case ω > 0 (i.e., negative impact of the wait), we investigate how reservation
and outsourcing could be implemented with ω < 0.
The optimal policy with ω < 0 can be obtained by recursively evaluating Vk using Equations (13) and
(14). Without the constraint PS ≤ PS , regardless of the contract cost Couts, we observe that extreme decisions
should be taken for outsourcing; either all calls should be served in-house (i.e., n = τ = ∞ is optimal) or
all calls should be outsourced (i.e., n = τ = 0, and c = 0). This result is proven in Proposition 4 when
assuming a threshold reservation policy. This means that it is never optimal to have a non-extreme proportion
of outsourced calls as was the case with ω > 0. Therefore, either the outsourcer should serve all inbound callers
(PS = 100%) and the call center becomes a specialized outbound contact center, or the call center should
not implement any outsourcing strategy (PS = 0%). In both cases, the two policy classes for outsourcing are
identical. When all calls are served in-house, the outbound call initiation follows a threshold policy as in the
case ω > 0. It is not possible to prove this result by induction on Vk however. The reason is that Vk(x) is no
longer decreasing and concave for x ≤ 0, or for any combination of the system parameters.
Proposition 4. For a given reservation threshold c, it is either optimal to have n = τ = 0 or n = τ =∞.
Figure 3 presents the optimal policy, computed with Equations (13) and (14), for different combinations
of the system parameters. Figure 3(a) presents the preference zones -separated by the curve- for outsourcing
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all inbound calls or serving all of them in-house as functions of the reward for initiating an outbound call,
r2, and customers’ expected patience, 1/β. Given that the wait has a positive effect on revenue with ω < 0,
the only motivation for having n = τ = 0 is to provide some service capacity for outbound calls. Therefore,
if n = τ = 0 is optimal, it means that outbound calls are significantly more valuable than inbound ones. In
order to maximize the time spent on outbound calls, it makes sense to also choose c = 0. As observed in
Figure 3(a), the motivation for choosing this strategy increases with the reward for serving an outbound call,
r2, and with the expected patience, 1/β. When it is optimal to be a specialized outbound call center, inbound
callers are seen as an obstacle to achieving high expected revenue. The reason is that these callers keep some
agents busy who could instead be initiating more valuable outbound calls. If the patience of inbound callers
increases, then inbound callers may stay longer in the system and agents could potentially be busier with
them. This strengthens the motivation to outsource all of them and explains the impact of patience.







    	 
  
	
	 


 	  
 


(a) Preference zone (λ = 10)







    
	

	

	

	
	
(b) Optimal reservation threshold (r2 = 0.01, n =
τ =∞)
Figure 3: Optimal policy (s = 10, µ = 1, r1 = 0.1, ω = −0.01, Couts = 1/10)
Figure 3(b) presents the way the optimal reservation threshold should be chosen as a function of expected
patience, 1/β, for different values of the arrival rate, λ, in a situation where it is optimal to have n = τ =∞
(i.e., no outsourcing). Reservation tends to increase with the arrival rate in such a way as to provide sufficient
idle agents for inbound callers. When inbound callers are very impatient (i.e., for low values of 1/β), the
wait plays a negligible role in the call center’s revenue since callers refuse to wait. Therefore, an increase in
customers’ patience is seen as an increase in demand for inbound calls. One way to respond to this demand is
to increase the reservation threshold, c. When callers are more patient, the wait can be used to increase the
call center’s revenue. The more patient customers are, the more profitable it is to let them wait. One way to
increase the wait is to reduce the reservation threshold, c. This explains the non-monotonous evolution of c
as a function of 1/β.
5.3 Analysis with different service rates
We now investigate the effect of having different service rates with class-1 and class-2 calls. We denote the
service rate of class-i calls by µi, for i = 1, 2. As in the case of equal service rates, if 1− sµ1/λ ≥ PS (unstable
situation), then the optimization problem has no solution. The optimal policy with different service rates is
likely to be a state-dependent threshold policy where the threshold depends on the number of class-1 and
class-2 calls in the system. From a practical point of view, a state-dependent threshold policy can be difficult
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to implement using call center software. Therefore, we prefer to study the simpler threshold policies considered
in the sections above. This choice is partially supported by the observation of Bhulai and Koole (2003) who
showed that a threshold policy is close to optimal in a similar reservation-related queueing model.
First, we evaluate the system performance under the two policy classes. Despite the fairly simple policies
under consideration, explicit analysis of the Markov chain is very involved. Alternatively, we propose to use
the value iteration technique to compute the performance measures. This approach is consistent with the
MDP approach of Section 3. The idea under both policy classes is to recursively define a value function,
denoted by Vk, on a 2-dimensional aperiodic irreducible finite state Markov chain. As k tends to infinity, the
Vk+1 − Vk difference tends to the sought metric.
Policy pi∗e . A state of the system is defined by the couple (x, y) where x is the number of calls (class-1
+ class-2) in the system and y is the number of class-2 customers in service, for s − c ≤ x ≤ s + n and
0 ≤ y ≤ s− c. We have
Vk+1(x, y) = c1(x− s)+ + λ
λ+ smax(µ1, µ2)
[1x<s+nVk(x+ 1, y) + 1x=s+n(Vk(x, y) + c2)] (17)
+
min(x− y, s− y)µ1
λ+ smax(µ1, µ2)
[1x>s−cVk(x− 1, y) + 1x=s−cVk(x, y + 1)]
+
yµ2
λ+ smax(µ1, µ2)
[c3 + 1x>s−cVk(x− 1, y − 1) + 1x=s−cVk(x, y)]
+
(
1− λ+ min(x− y, s− y)µ1 + yµ2
λ+ smax(µ1, µ2)
)
Vk(x, y),
with V0(x, y) = 0, for s − c ≤ x ≤ s + n and 0 ≤ y ≤ s − c, and where the cost parameters c1, c2, and c3 are
chosen in order to derive the performance measures. With c1 =
1
λ and c2 = c2 = 0, we obtain the expected
waiting time E(W ). With c2 =
λ+smax(µ1,µ2)
λ and c1 = c3 = 0, we obtain the proportion of outsourced
customers, PS . Using E(W ) = (1 − PS)E(WS), the expected waiting time of served customers can also be
determined. Finally, with c3 = λ+ smax(µ1, µ2) and c1 = c2 = 0, we obtain the throughput of served class-2
customers. Therefore, the expected revenue and the service quality can be fully determined.
Policy pi∗l . We use the approximated model defined in Section 3. The maximal number of waiting phases is
denoted by n, with nγ = τ . A state of the system is defined by the couple (x, y) where s+ x is the number of
calls (class-1 + class-2) in the system if x ≤ 0 or x is the waiting phase of the FIL if x > 0 and y is the number
of class-2 customers in service, for −c ≤ x ≤ n and 0 ≤ y ≤ s− c. We extend the definition of the operator F
to the set of functions f from Z2 to R by F (f(x, y)) =
x∑
h=0
qx,x−hf(x−h, y) for x > 0, and F (f(x, y)) = f(x, y)
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for x ≤ 0. We have
Vk+1(x, y) = c1x
+ +
λ
λ+ γ + smax(µ1, µ2)
[1−c≤x≤0Vk(x+ 1, y) + 10<x≤nVk(x, y)] (18)
+
γ
λ+ γ + smax(µ1, µ2)
[1−c≤x≤0Vk(x, y) + 10<x<nVk(x+ 1, y) + 1x=n(F (Vk(x, y)) + c2)]
+
min(x+ s− y, s− y)µ1
λ+ γ + smax(µ1, µ2)
[1x=−cVk(x, y + 1) + 1−c<x≤0Vk(x− 1, y) + 10<x≤nF (Vk(x, y))]
+
yµ2
λ+ γ + smax(µ1, µ2)
[c3 + 1x=−cVk(x, y) + 1−c<x≤0Vk(x− 1, y − 1) + 10<x≤nF (Vk(x, y − 1))]
+
(
1− λ+ γ + min(x+ s− y, s− y)µ1 + yµ2
λ+ γ + smax(µ1, µ2)
)
Vk(x, y),
with V0(x, y) = 0, for −c ≤ x ≤ n and 0 ≤ y ≤ s − c. With c1 = sµλγ and c2 = c3 = 0, we obtain the
expected waiting time of served customers, E(WS). With c2 =
λ+θ+smax(µ1,µ2)
λ and c1 = c3 = 0, we obtain
the proportion of outsourced customers, PS . Using E(W ) = (1 − PS)E(WS) + PS nγ , the expected waiting
time of served and outsourced customers can also be determined. Finally, with c3 = λ+γ+ smax(µ1, µ2) and
c1 = c2 = 0, we obtain the throughput of served class-2 customers.
Under both policy classes, the optimal thresholds can be computed using Algorithm 1. Before comparing
the two policy classes, in Figure 4 we evaluate the impact of the service rate of class-2 calls on the expected
revenue and on the quality of service under Policy pi∗e . Note that similar observations could be made for Policy
pi∗l . In the different examples (µ2 = 0.5, 1, and 2), we selected the product r2 × µ2 = 1, such that the revenue
rate of an agent working on a class-2 call is maintained as constant. As expected, we can observe that the
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(b) E(W )
Figure 4: Impact of the service rate of class-2 customers (s = 10, µ1 = 1, r1 = 3, r2 × µ2 = 1, ω = 1,
Couts
λPS
= 1/2, PS = 30%, a priori policy)
expected revenue increases and the expected waiting time decreases with µ2. When the class-2 calls service is
short, there are more opportunities either to initiate more class-2 calls or to serve class-1 calls with a shorter
waiting time. Nevertheless, the expected revenue is not highly sensitive to µ2 (Figure 4(a)) and the sensitivity
of the expected waiting time to µ2 tends to decrease with the arrival rate. When the arrival rate is low, the
revenue is mostly driven by the class-2 calls service. The expected waiting time of served class-1 calls has only
a little effect on the revenue. This explains why the revenue is also virtually insensitive to µ2 in this case.
As λ increases, the effect of the waiting time on the revenue increases but fewer class-2 calls are initiated.
This reduces the effect of µ2 on E(W ) and E(WS). Moreover, when the arrival rate is very high, then c = s
is optimal. Therefore, the call center only treats class-1 calls. This cancels out the effect of the class-2 calls
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service rate.
We are also interested in the impact of µ2 in the comparison between the two policy classes. In Figure 5,
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Figure 5: Impact of the service rate of class-2 calls (s = 10, λ = 12, µ1 = 1, r1 = 3, r2 × µ2 = 1, ω = 1,
Couts
λPS
= 1/2, PS = 30%)
we give the expected revenue and the expected waiting time as functions of µ2. We choose λ = 12 in order
to consider a zone where the service rate µ2 sufficiently impacts the expected revenue (see Figure 4(a)). As
expected from Figure 4(a), the expected revenue increases with µ2. Contrary to what was observed in Figure
4(b), the expected waiting time can increase in µ2. This is due to the choice of threshold parameters which
incentivizes initiation of class-2 calls detrimentally to the service of class-1 customers. The difference between
the two policy classes in terms of expected revenue (Figure 5(a)) and expected waiting time (Figure 5(b)) is
maximal when µ2 is close to µ1. When µ2 tends to zero, the expected service time of a class-2 call tends to
infinity. Initiating a class-2 call would thus block an agent. It is therefore optimal not to initiate any class-2
call (i.e., c = s is optimal). The waiting time of class-1 calls is therefore low, which also renders the difference
between the two policy classes low. As µ2 increases, initiating class-2 calls becomes more interesting. The
choice is thus to decrease the reservation threshold, which in turns leads to higher waiting times for class-1
calls and to a higher difference between the two policy classes. When µ2 is high, it becomes optimal not to
reserve any agents for class-1 calls (i.e., c = 0 is optimal). Therefore, the effect of increasing µ2 is to reduce
the waiting time of class-1 calls, which in turn reduces the difference between the two outsourcing policies.
6 Conclusion
The practice of initiating or outsourcing calls in contact centers is becoming increasingly prevalent. These two
levels of decisions allow managers to meet service quality and revenue targets. However, to our knowledge, no
papers have addressed the control problem of outsourcing and reservation within a single framework. To this
end, we considered a call center with inbound and outbound calls in a cross-selling context. One distinguishing
feature of our model was that the propensity of inbound callers to buy was related to their waiting experience,
based on the understanding that it may be detrimental to keep customers too long in the system. One solution
to limit system congestion is to outsource part of the inbound calls. To maximize the call center’s revenue, we
considered the impact of call outsourcing following a wait (a posteriori outsourcing) as against outsourcing
upon arrival (a priori outsourcing).
Using a Markov decision process approach, we proved the optimality of a reservation and outsourcing
28
threshold policy. By studying the relative value function under the optimal policy, we showed that the optimal
outsourcing threshold could be computed within a finite number of iterations. Next, we derived closed-form
expressions of the performance measures under both policy classes and proved the first and second order
monotonicity results in the control parameters. Our main finding was that postponing an outsourcing decision
improves the call center’s revenue by better serving in-house customers, albeit detrimentally to outsourced
ones. We believe that this result can be extended to other cases where the main focus is on served customers.
We showed that the benefits of implementing an a posteriori policy were most significant in small congested
call centers with relatively patient customers, similar expected service time for inbound and outbound calls,
and when the wait has a negative effect on customers’ purchase behavior.
Our analysis can be extended in several other directions to better model the operational complexity of
call centers, as well as that of customer behavior. One important extension from a practical viewpoint is to
allow for non-stationary arrivals or arrivals which depend on the previous customers’ experiences with the call
center to account for retention or acquisition phenomena. The call centers’ complexity may include multiple
pools of agents, different channels (chats, emails), as well as more complex service requirements. Also, from
a practical perspective, separate pools of agents often handle inbound calls or initiate outbound calls. This
paper provides a deeper understanding of the benefits of cross-training agents to perform each of these tasks.
At methodological level, we believe that the idea of constructing a time-based decision-making policy is general
enough to apply to other operations management issues. For instance, in situations where the holding cost
function is non-linear, it could be interesting to develop such policies as opposed to quantity-based ones.
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